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Reid v. Trie
349 F.3d 788 (4th Cir. 2003)
L Facts
James Edward Reid ("Reid") claimed to have no memory of murdering
eighty-year-old Annie Lester ("Lester"), whose bodywas discovered on October
12, 1996.' On the morning of Lester's murder, Reid received a ride to her
house.2 Along the way, he purchased a bottle of wine.3 After he arrived, the last
thing Reid remembered from that day was writing something on a card in
Lester's house.4
The card, later found by police, read "I've gotta kill you."' The evidence
indicated that Reid struck Lester in the head with a milk can while they were in
the kitchen, dragged her to the bedroom, stabbed her twenty-two times with a
pair of sewing scissors, and strangled her with the cord from her heating pad.6
Police found the bottle of wine at the foot of the bed, Reid's fingerprints in
blood on the telephone, his saliva on a cigarette butt in the bedroom, and his
handwriting on several pieces of paper in Lester's house.7 Later that afternoon,
witnesses saw Reid walking from Lester's house soaked in blood and
intoxicated. DNA tests revealed that the blood belonged to Lester.9
Upon the advice of his attorneys, Reid entered an A 46dplea to a charge of
capital murder.'0 After finding that Reid's conduct was sufficiently vile, the trial
judge sentenced himto death." On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia
1. Reid v. True, 349 F.3d 788, 794 (4th Cit. 2003). In 1968 Reid was involved in an
automobile accident that resulted in a coma and brain damage. Id at 802-03. He also suffered

from a seizure disorder. Id
2. Id at 794.
3. Id
4. Id at 801.
5. Id
6. Idat 794, 801.
7. Red, 349 F.3d at 794.
8. Id
9. Id
10. Id; sw North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (allowing that "[a]n individual
accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a

prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting

the crime").
11. Reid,349 F.3d at 794; seeVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Mlchie 2000) (stating that a judge
may impose the death penalty upon finding that a defendant's conduct in the course of the murder
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of
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upheld the sentence and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 2 In
his subsequent petition for state habeas relief Reid argued that he had not
knowingly and voluntarily entered his A 'md plea and that his counsel were
ineffective. 3 The Supreme Court of Virginia found "that the first claim was
defaulted and that the second was without merit."' 4 The district court, after
conducting an evidentiary hearing to discover whether Reid's counsel fully
informed him of the effect of an A /fodplea, denied Reid's petition for federal
habeas relief.'"
IL Hddin
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a certificate of appealability for all of Reid's claims.' 6 The Fourth Circuit upheld the
district court's ruling that Reid's ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacked
merit." The court also agreed with the district court's holding that Reid had
procedurally defaulted his claim that his A #&d plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily entered.'"
X. A ?l1S
A. I ffetieAssStanx c Ccwsd
Because the Supreme Court of Virginia adjudicated Reid's ineffective
assistance of counsel claims on the merits, the Fourth Circuit could only grant
habeas relief if the state decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States." 9 Additionally, the district court held a fact-finding
hearing on whether Reid's counsel were ineffective in failing to apprise him fully
mind or an aggravated battery to the victim").
12. Reid v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 787,793 (Va. 1998); Reid v. Virginia, 528 U.S. 833,
833 (1999) (mesn.).
13. ReA 349 F.3d at 794-95. Reid also argued that the trial judge's comments at the time
of sentencing indicated he failed to consider mitigating evidence. Id at 806. The Fourth Circuit
denied relief on this claim, which will not be discussed further in this case note. Id at 807.
14. Id at 795.

15.

Id

16. Id The court appended the amended local rules detailing the procedures with which
petitioners must comply in seeking certificates of appealability and briefly discussed the amendments in Part II of the opinion. Id at 795-98, 809-16. For a complete discussion of 4TH iR.
R.
22(a), see Maxwell C Smith, Rule Note, 16 CAP.DEF.J. 635 (analyzing 4TH QCR.R 22).
17. Reid 349 F.3d at 802-04.
18. Id at 804-06.
19. Id at 798; see
28 U.S.C S2254(d)(1) (2000) (outlining the standard of reviewto be applied
by a federal court hearing a habeas petition arising from a state proceeding on the merits; part of
AEDPA).

2004]

REID V TRUE

of the consequences of an A /od plea.20 The Fourth Circuit could only grant

relief in spite of the district court's findings if they were "clearly erroneous."21

1. Coataryto
The Fourth Circuit first examined whether the Supreme Court of Virginia's
opinion was contraryto clearlyestablished federal law.22 The Fourth Circuit held
that a state court decision would be contraryto federal law if a state court applied
a rule contraryto governing law enunciated in Supreme Court cases or if the state
court faced a fact pattern identical to a Supreme Court case but reached a differ-

ent result.23
In Wians v Wankd ("Wlhiar "), the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that to prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must satisfy
the two-part test of Stidladv Wasbi,tce and also must show that the result
of the trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.26 In Wzdliamr v TaW
(" Wdli/n- I'), the United States Supreme Court corrected the Supreme Court
of Virginia byreaffirming that the two prongs of Striclari were the only necessary elements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 2 s Reid argued that
because the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim after its decision in Wdliaxn I, but before the Supreme Court
decided Widian I, the Fourth Circuit should presume that the Supreme Court
of Virginia clearly misapplied federal law.29
20.
21.

Rei, 349 F.3d at 803.
Id at 804; seeFED.R.Qv. P. 52(a) (stating that factual findings bythe district court should

remain undisturbed unless clearly erroneous); FED. R QV. P. 8 1(a)(2) (applying the Federal Rules
of Cvil Procedure to habeas corpus proceedings to the extent they are not inconsistent with
another statute).
22. Re 349 F.3d at 798-800.
23. Id at 798 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000)).
24.
487 S.E.2d 194 (Va. 1997).
25. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
26. Se Williams v. Warden, 487 S-E.2d 194, 198 (Va. 1997) (holding that "an analysis
focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the
proceeding was fundamentallyunfair or unreliable, isdefective" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-96 (1984) (holding that to prove a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show. (1) counsel's performance fell below the objective
standard of reasonableness and outside the wide range of professional competency; and (2) the
performance prejudiced the defense in that if counsel had met the professional standards the result
of the proceeding would have been different).
27. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
28. Sw Wdlianz, 529 US. at 393-95 (noting that the Supreme Court of Virginia incorrectly
apied Sttikanidby requiring that the appellant show the result of the proceeding was fundamenunfair or unreliable, as well as the two prongs of Strik&7aL to prove ineffective assistance of
counsel.
29. R64 349 F.3d at 799.
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The Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court of Virginia did not state

its reasons for denying Reid's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." The
Fourth Circuit relied on Eadyv Packer,31 which held that when a state court fails

to indicate on what federal law it based its decision, the result reached by the
state court should be the focus of review?2 The court's review under the

"contrary to" prong of S 2254(d)(1) was consequently "limited to determining

whether the state court decision [was] contrary to a decision reached by the
Supreme Court on indistinguishable facts."33 Reid made no argument that the
Supreme Court of Virginia's decision contradicted a result reached bythe United
States Supreme Court on indistinguishable facts.34 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit
turned to the other prong of S 2254(d) (1)and sought to determine whether the
state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent."
2. Unmras=&neApp&i6iwnqf
a. VdvayIntaicadtin

Reid claimed that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
pursue a defense of voluntary intoxication. 6 In Virginia, voluntary intoxication
offers no excuse for a crime, but when a person becomes so intoxicated that he
or she is unable to deliberate or premeditate, that person cannot commit a type
of murder that requires a showing of those elements." When deciding if an
individual was too intoxicated to deliberate, Virginia courts consider whether the
person tried to conceal the murder, ingested the intoxicants long before the
crime, acted in a planned and purposeful fashion, and could perform complicated
tasks."
30.

Id

31.
32.

537 U.S. 3 (2002).
Rag 349 F.3d at 799; swEarlyv. Packer, 537 U.S. 3,8 (2002) (percuriam) (explaining that

for purposes of habeas review, correct application of federal law "does not require citation of our
cases- indeed, it does not even require aunwiafs of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor
the result of the state-court decision contradicts them").
33. Reg 349 F.3d at 799; sw 28 U.S.C § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (allowing a federal court to grant
habeas relief in a case in which the state court decision was contraryto federal law, plainlyenunciated by the United States Supreme Court; part of AEDPA).
34. R6i4 349 F.3d at 799-800.
35. Id at 800.
36. Id
37. SeeWright v. Commonwealth, 363 S.E.2d 711,712 (Va. 1988) (deciding that "[g)enerally,

voluntary intoxication isnot an excuse for any crime," but "when a person voluntarily becomes so
intoxicated that he is incapable of deliberation or premeditation, he cannot commit a class of
murder that requires proof of a deliberate and premediated killing");sealsoVA. CODE ANN. S 18.231 (Michie Supp. 2003) (requiring a murder to be a "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing"

to fall within the purview of the statute).
38. Re"4 349 F.3d at 800; seHedrick v. Warden, 570 S.E.2d 840, 851 (Va. 2002) (finding the
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The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that under these factors, some of Reid's
behavior surrounding the murder implied that he might have been too intoxicated to deliberate or premeditate.39 Reid consumed alcohol at the same time he
committed the murder, he did not attempt to conceal the crime, and he wandered
the neighborhood drunk and covered in blood.4" Moreover, the two experts who
examined Reid concluded that given his prior mental problems, consuming
alcohol probably impaired his abilityto reason. 1 However, the Fourth Circuit
also noticed that other evidence suggested Reid was capable of deliberate
thought.42 The Fourth Circuit believed that Reid's choice of several weapons
during the murder (the milk can, the scissors, and the electrical cord), the fact
that he incapacitated his victim in the kitchen and dragged her to the bedroom,
and his threatening writings on the card indicated that he may have had some
capacity to deliberate and premeditate during the murder.43
The Fourth Circuit also considered an affidavit submitted by Reid's trial
counsel in which he claimed that he believed a jurywould not have been receptive to a voluntary intoxication defense and that other capital litigation experts
advised him to avoid a jury trial." Because the Commonwealth indicated it was
trial counsel not ineffective for failing to pursue a defense of voluntaryintoxication when an interval
of at least five hours separated the intoxication from the crime, the defendant acted in a purposeful
fashion, and counsel actually presented some evidence of voluntary intoxication at trial); Lilly v.
Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 536 (Va. 1998) (stating that an abilityto perform the complicated
task of driving a car implied an ability to deliberate), mtd maer
on
grwrl, 527 U.S. 116 (1999);
Girratano v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 94, 100 (Va. 1980) (ruling that an attempt to obscure the
crime may indicate the ability to deliberate).
39. Red 342 F.3d at 800.
40. Id
41. Id at 800-01.
42. Idat801.
43. Id
44. Id Reid's trial counsel, Peter Theodore ("Theodore"), maintained that the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse ("VCCC') advised Theodore to plead Reid guiltyto avoid a jury trial.
VCCC never advised Theodore to enter a plea of guilty without first obtaining a fixed sentence
agreement from the prosecution. Indeed, many of Theodore's contentions in the affidavit relied
on by the Fourth Circuit were later revealed to be untrue in a proceeding before the Disciplinary
Board of the Virginia State Bar. Matter of Theodore, VSB no. 01-101-0653 (Disciplinary Board
of the Va. State Bar 2002), athttp://www.vsb.org/disciplinmryorders/theordore opinionhtml (last
visited Mar. 28, 2004). In that proceeding, Theodore admitted that he was unaware of any case in
Montgomery County (the site of Reid's trial) in which jurors unfavorably reacted to a voluntary
intoxication defense and that he had never conducted a jury trial in that county. Id Theodore still
maintained that no experienced capital defense counsel or local or national capital defense group
advised him to proceed to a jury trial. Id The state bar amassed three affidavits from the experienced defense counsel with whom Theodore consulted in which the counsel stated that they never
advised Theodore to plead Reid guilty to avoid a jury trial. Id Therefore, the Fourth Crcuit's
reliance on Theodore's affidavit to show that sound strategic considerations weighed against
entering a plea of "not guilty" and proceeding with a defense of voluntary intoxication was highly
questionable. VCCC does not advise defense lawyers in a capital trial to enter a guiltyplea without
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unwilling to waive a jury if the case went to trial, the defense counsel felt constrained to advise Reid to enter the A /fdplea to avoid a jury trial 45 In light of
the conflicting evidence to support the defense of voluntaryintoxication and the
strategic considerations against such a defense, the Fourth Circuit determined
that the Supreme Court of Virginia did not unreasonably apply United States
Supreme Court precedent in holding that Reid's trial counsel was not ineffective
for failing to pursue a defense of voluntary intoxication.46
b. Inamity

Similarly, Reid argued that by not advising him to pursue an insanity defense, his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 7 An accused in Virginia may
establish insanity through either the M'Na ten Rule or the irresistible impulse
doctrine.4" In either event, the burden rests on the accused to prove insanity
during the crime.49 Under the M'Naken Rule, the defendant mayprove insanity
by virtue of a mental disease that caused the defendant not to know the nature
and quality of his act or the act's wrongfulness. 0 The irresistible impulse doctrine requires the defendant to show that
mental disease so impaired his mind
51
that he was unable to restrain his acts.
Reid claimed that the reports of two doctors, which noted brain damage
Reid suffered in a 1968 automobile accident and resultant coma, should have
caused his counsel to pursue an insanity defense. 2 The court noted that one
doctor concluded that because Reid did not remember the crime and no witnesses saw the murder, the evidence was insufficient to support a MNa& n
defense."3 Moreover, both doctors believed Reid's abilityto control his actions
during the crime was merelydiminished, not extinguished. 4 Therefore, the court
first obtaining a written fixed sentence agreement from the Commonwealth in which the defendant's plea is contingent on the trial judge accepting the deal. See ifia Part IV (recommending
proper plea procedures in capital cases).
45. R64 349 F.3d at 801-02.
46. Id at 802.
47. Id
48. Id; see Bennett v. Commonwealth, 511 S.E.2d 439, 446 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming
that "Virginia law recognizes two tests by which an accused can establish criminal insanity, the
M'Naghten Rule and the irresistible impulse doctrine").
49. See Wessells v. Commonwealth, 180 S.E. 419, 422 (Va. 1935) (stating that "the burden
of proving insanity is on the person who alleges it").
50. Reg 349 F.3d at 802.
51. Id; see BePMt 511 S.E.2d at 447 (discussing when a defendant may use the irresistible
impulse test).
52. Reid 349 F.3d at 802-03.
53. Id at 803.
54. Id
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found reasonable the state court's determination that counsel acted effectivelyin
not further investigating an insanity defense,"
3. FactFiring

In his final ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Reid argued that his
counsel was deficient for failing to ascertain whether Reid truly understood the
nature of an A !fo&dplea. 6 During the factfinding hearing that the district court
conducted on this part of Reid's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Reid
claimed that his counsel did not tell him that an A #'ord plea is a guilty plea and
that he could receive a death sentence on such a plea.57 Counsel denied failing
to advise Reid of the nature of an A 4'ad plea during the hearing and produced
a letter, signed by Reid before entering his plea, indicating that Reid understood
that an A !rdplea was a guiltyplea upon which he could be sentenced to death. 8
Furthermore, Reid indicated that he understood the nature of an A f6d plea
during his plea colloquy with the judge at trial.5 9 Therefore, the district court
found that Reid's counsel properly explained the nature of an A #&d plea to him
and denied his claim. ° The Fourth Circuit found that the district court's factual
determinations were not clearly erroneous and thus declined to overturn the
result.6
B. Guilty Plea aP d

ualDefault

Reid argued that the trial court erred by not examining his plea with greater
care because his guiltyplea could not have been knowing and voluntary because
he did not understand what an A brd plea was or that after entering it he could
be sentenced to death.62 Reid first raised this claim in his state habeas petition,
and the Supreme Court of Virginia found that under the rule in S/ay(n u

56.

Id at 802-03.
Id at 803.

57.

Id; see 28 U.S.C S 2254(e)(2) (2002) (allowing a district court to hold an evidentiary

55.

hearing on the factual part of a claim if the facts went undeveloped in state court, the Supreme
Court has made a new constitutional law retroactive to cases on collateral review, the factual
predicate for the claim could not have been discovered through due diligence, or the facts underly
ing the claim are so convincing that no reasonable factfinder could have found against the defendant but for constitutional error; part of AEDPA).
58. Reg 349 F.3d at 803-04.
59. Id at 804.
60.

Id

61. Id; see FED. R Yiv.
P. 52(a) (stating that factual findings by the district court should
remain undisturbed unless clearly erroneous); FED. R.Civ. P. 81(a)(2) (applying the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to habeas corpus proceedings to the extent they are not inconsistent with
another statute).
62.

Re" 349 F.3d at 804.
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Panigv 3 it was defaulted.64 When a state court declines to consider a constitutional claim on the merits because of an "adequate and independent state procedural rule," the federal habeas court may only review the determination if the
petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.65
1. AdTqacy Slayton
Reid argued that Slatoncould not provide the basis for a procedural default
because it was not an adequate state procedural rule.66 The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that a state procedural rule is adequate if it is regularly applied in most
cases in which the rule is brought to a court's attention bythe State." The court
stated that in determining howconsistentlya rule had been applied, the reviewing
court should only look to procedurally similar cases to the one at hand.68 The
Fourth Circuit first noted that it had alreadydecided that SLmton was an adequate
procedural rule but recognized that it still had to examine the adequacyof S/aycon
as applied to cases like Reid's.6 9
Reid produced three Virginia cases in which the petitioners in state habeas
proceedings argued that their guilty pleas were neither knowing nor voluntary
after defaulting their claims on direct appeal and the Supreme Court of Virginia
failed to apply Slaytc& ° In the first case Reid presented, Walton v A rngd, 1 the
63. 205 S.E.2d 680 (Va. 1974).
64. RPei 349 F.3d at 804; seSlayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680,682 (Va. 1974) (stating that
petitioners lack standing to seek habeas relief for claims not asserted at trial or on direct appeal).
65. ReA 349 F.3d at 804; se Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989) (stating that "an
adequate and independent finding of procedural default will bar federal habeas review of the federal
claim, unless the habeas petitioner can show 'cause' for the default and 'prejudice attributable
thereto' or demonstrate that failure to consider the federal claim will result in a 'fundamental
miscarriage of justice'" (citations omitted)).
66.
67.

Rei, 349 F.3d at 804.
Id at 804-05; sieJohnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (finding that a state

procedural rule is adequate ifit is regularly or strictly applied); Plath v. Moore, 130 F.3d 595, 602
(4th Cir. 1997) (stating that a state procedural rule applied in the substantial majority of cases has
been applied with sufficient regularityto be deemed adequate); Meadows v. Legursky, 904 F.2d 903,
907 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (listing apparent failure of State to direct court's attention to state
procedural rule as a possible reason to conclude that a case was not an exception to a general
procedural rule).
68. Reid 349 F.3d at 805; sEBrown v. Lee, 319 F.3d 162,170 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that the
adequacy of a procedural rule depends on the consistency of its application to a certain class of
constitutional claims); McCarver v. Lee, 221 F.3d 583, 589 (4th Cr. 2000) (identifying the relevant
inquiry in determining the adequacy of a state procedural rule as whether the rule has been applied
consistently to procedurally analogous cases).
69. R9 349 F.3d at 805; see Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 159-60 (4th Cr. 1998)
(deciding Skartcm is an adequate state procedural rule).
70. R64 349 F.3d at 805; seeWalton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442,451 (4th Cir. 2003) (summarizing how inan unpublished decision the Supreme Court of Virginia denied the petitioner's claim
for relief on the grounds it conflicted with statements made during his guiltyplea), art.dniaA 123
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Supreme Court of Virginia did not consider whether the petitioner's claim was
defaulted on the basis of S/rjaebut instead found that underA iensonuv Wardr2
the claim was defaulted. 3 The Fourth Circuit determined that the Supreme
Court of Virginia was under no obligation to state each possible basis for a
procedural default and therefore its failure to applythe Slamnrule in Waltondid
not constitute an instance in which a state court declined to apply the state
procedural rule.74 The next case Reid relied on was Chapmn v A ngdow." In
.lwpn,,n, the Supreme Court of Virginia applied the A rkerson rule to the petitioner s ineffective assistance of counsel claim but altogether failed to rule on the
petitioner's claim that his plea was entered involuntarily. 6 Because the court
applied A ndeson on one claim and did not rule on the other, the Fourth Circuit
found that Chaprmnalso did not support Reid's argument."7 Lastly, Reid cited
Gardre v Warldr as an instance in which the state court declined to apply
S/a)t" 7 The Fourth Circuit noted that nothing in the case implied that the
Commonwealth ever drew the court's attention to the Sla)ton rule, but even if it
had, one instance in which the state court declined to apply the rule would not
suffice to show that the rule was applied with sufficient irregularityto be deemed
inadequate."0

S. Ct. 2626; Chapman v. Angelone, No. 98-7419, 1999 WL 511062, at *2 (4th Cit. July 20, 1999)
(per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (noting that in the state habeas proceeding the Supreme
Court of Virginia failed to rule on petitioner's involuntary plea claim); Gardner v. Warden, 281
S.E.2d 876, 878 (Va. 1981) (examining defaulted involuntaryplea claim on the merits).
71. 321 F.3d 442 (4th Cr. 2003).
72. 281 S.E.2d 885 (Va. 1981).
73. Rei 349 F.3d at 805; see Watn, 321 F.3d at 451 (stating how in an unpublished decision
the Supreme Court of Virginia denied the petitioner's claim for relief because it was inconsistent
with statements he made during his guilty plea); Anderson v. Warden, 281 S.E.2d 885, 888 (Va.
1981) (holding that the veracity and reliabilityof the defendants statements "as to the adequacy of
his court-appointed counsel and the voluntariness of his guiltyplea will be considered conclusively
established by the trial proceedings, unless the prisoner offers a valid reason why he should be
permitted to controvert his prior statements").
74.
75.

Reid, 349 F.3d at 805.
Id; sw Chapv4m, 1999 WL 511062, at "2 (recalling that the Supreme Court of Virginia

denied the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims underAnkn but did not rule on
the involuntaryplea claim during the state habeas proceeding).
76.
77.
78.
79.

Clrpnvm
1999 WL 511062, at 2.
Reig 349 F.3d at 806.
281 S.E.2d 876 (Va. 1981).
ReiA 349 F.3d at 806; sw Ganrw, 281 S.E.2d at 878 (examining a defaulted involuntary

plea claim on the merits).
80.

Rd, 349 F.3d at 806.
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2. Cause

Next, Reid argued that his counsel's ineffective assistance supplied sufficient
cause to explain his procedural default."1 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that
ineffective assistance of counsel may excuse such a procedural default.82 However, because the court already had found that Reid's counsel were effective, the
court decided that Reid had not demonstrated anycause to excuse his procedural
default.8 3
3. Miscamageofl ste
Reid also contended that if the Fourth Circuit failed to hear his involuntary
plea claim on the merits, a fundamental miscarriage of justice would ensue. 4 In
Soh/up v Ddo,3 the United States Supreme Court explained that petitioners who
had defaulted constitutional claims in state court proceedings could revive them
upon the production of new evidence "so strong that a court cannot have
confidence in the outcome of the trial." 6 Under SJup, the strong new evidence
of innocence acts as a gatewaythrough which prisoners' defaulted constitutional
claims of trial error maypass into a habeas court.8 7 However, because Reid failed
to produce any new evidence of his innocence, the Fourth Circuit found that the
S&up gateway could not aid Reid in overcoming his procedural default. 8
IV. Application m Vima
Reid illustrates the dangers that accompany entering a guiltyplea without a
deal. Reid's counsel believed that the trial judge would be sympathetic to Reid's
guilty plea. Counsel assumed this because the same judge sentenced a different
defendant to life imprisonment in a case that involved what appeared to be more
egregious facts .9 In reality, such predictions are impossible to make with any
certainty. Even a judge who appears sympathetic can impose a death sentence.'
81.

Id

82. Id; se Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (concluding that "[ilneffective
assistance of counsel, then, is cause for a procedural default").
83. Reid 349 F.3d at 806.

84.
85.

Id
513 U.S. 298 (1995).

86.

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995) (holing that a habeas court may hear an

otherwise barred constitutional claim when the petitioner produces new evidence so strong that it
removes the habeas court's confidence in the state trial's outcome).

87.

Id

88.
89.
90.

Reg 349 F.3d at 806.
Id at 802.
Sw Jamie C Ruff, Wor=RexmnDan Swen Guilty inSlap qfHwba

Stepson Ric.

TIMEs-DIsPATci-, June 4, 2003, at Al, 2003 WL 8024088 (describing how Teresa Lewis pleaded

guiltyto capital murder, was sentenced to death, and is nowthe first woman on Virginia's death row
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Therefore, counsel should seekto avoid the uncertainties of trial through negotiation.
Aplea bargain maytake one of two forms. In exchange for the defendant's
plea of guilty, the prosecution may agree to recommend a sentence or not to
oppose the defendant's request for a particular sentence, but such an agreement
is not binding on a judge. 9' Alternatively, the parties mayreach a plea agreement
in which the defendant will only plead guilty if the judge agrees to the sentence
in the agreement. 2 In a capital case, an agreement in which the defendant pleads
guilty and the prosecutor only agrees to rxetnwr a life sentence can, and occasionallywill, result in a death sentence." Therefore, counsel should be careful to
negotiate a stipulation in which the plea is wntien upon the judge agreeing to
the sentence. Because all capital cases are felonycases, such an agreement must
be in writing. 4 Moreover, without a fixed written agreement, a defendant could
plead guilty and find himself facing a sentence of death without anytrial error to
appeal.
Reid also provides a useful comparison to the recent Supreme Court decision in Wi~hs u Snith.9 In Wmgin, the Court found that counsel who had
investigated mitigating circumstances and found some evidence of a difficult
youth and mental retardation acted ineffectivelyin not further investigating those
issues. 6 Reiterating the minimum standard of investigation required for effective
assistance of counsel as set forth in Sti&/ka the Court concluded that" 'strategic choices made afterless than complete investigation are reasonable' onlyto the
since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976).
91. SeeVA. SUP. Cr. R.3AA8(c)(1)(B) (stating that the Commonwealth mayagree to recommend a particular sentence or not oppose a defendant's request for a sentence if the defendant
pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or lesser-included offense); VA. SUP. Cr. K,
3A.8(c)(2) (stating that the court maychoose to ignore the sentence recommended or requested in
aplea agreement made pursuant to VA. SUP. er. R. 3A.8(c)(1)(B) and the defendant will be unable
to withdraw the plea).
92. Sw VA. SUP. Cr. , 3A8(c)(1)(A) (allowg the prosecution to dismiss some charges in
exchange for a guiltyplea on other charges); VA. SUP. Cr. K,3A_8(c)(1)(q (permitting the prosecution to "[agree that a specific sentence isthe appropriate disposition of the case"); VA. SUP. Cr.R_
3A.8(c)(4) (stating that if the plea agreement iscontingent on the judge accepting the sentence and
the plea, then the defendant may withdraw the guilty or nolo contendere plea if the judge indicates
an unwillingness to accept the agreement).
93. SeDubois v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E.2d 636, 637 (Va. 1993) (describing how despite
a plea agreement pursuant to which Dubois pleaded guilty to capital murder and the Commonwealth agreed not to seek the death penalty, the trial judge imposed a death sentence).
94. VA. SUP. Cr. K 3A:8(c)(2) (stating that "[ilf a plea agreement has been reached by the
parties, it shall, in every felony case, be reduced to writing").
95. Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Cc. 2527, 2541-42 (2003) (concluding that strategic choices
made after a partialinvestigation are reasonable to the extent that reasonable professional judgment
dictated the
tone investigation). Sigma/yTerrence T. Egland, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.
J.101 (2003) (analyzing Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S.Ct.2527 (2003)).
96.
Wt&s,123 S.Cc. at 2537.
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extent that 'reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation."' 97 InRe4 the Fourth Circuit found that counsel acted reasonablyin not
pursuing an insanity defense when both experts indicated such an approach
would probably be fruitless.98 Therefore, although the Fourth Circuit did not
explicitly follow Wigim in determining whether counsel acted effectively in
investigating Reid's insanity defense, the result reached by the Fourth Circuit
appears consistent with the decision in Wi&N as the expert's testimonydiscounting Reid's insanitydefense reasonably indicated that further investigation would
be fruitless.99
Finally, Reidindicates that a petitioner who seeks to assert a claim in habeas
court that was earlier defaulted in state court will have great difficulty showing
that the state procedural rule was inadequate. The result of the Fourth Circuit's
reading of Walton, Cbaptnp,
and Gardneris that a petitioner will be able to show
that a state procedural rule is inadequate only if on more than one occasion the
Commonwealth has urged the state court to employ the rule and, without
applying a different rule or failing to rule on the claim altogether, the court
declined to invoke the rule."° Certainly, such cases will be rare and, moreover,
if the procedural rule has been applied in numerous cases, then petitioner might
need to cite more than two such cases, which could prove to be challenging.''
Nonetheless, in Branv Le&-2 a petitioner to the Fourth Circuit made just
such a showing." 3 In that case, the state procedural rule was applied in onlyfour
of nine possible cases.) 4 The Fourth Circuit found it was sporadically applied
and hence an inadequate procedural default rule.' Brouw, however, was something of an anomalous decision. In that case, the procedural rule at issue was a
state statute that at one time specifically allowed the state court to choose to
ignore the procedural default and decide the claim on the merits.106 Most of the
97.

Id at 2541 (quoting Strkliar* 466 U.S. at 690-91).

98.

Reid 342 F.3d at 802-03.

99. See id (finding that Reid's counsel were not ineffective in failing to pursue an insanity
defense because both experts indicated the evidence was insufficient to support such a defense).
100. Id at 804-06.
101.
Id
102. 319 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2003).
103. See Bmrun, 319 F.3d at 174-75 (finding that a state procedural default rule was only
invoked in four of nine cases in which it could have been used and it was therefore inconsistently
applied and inadequate). For a complete discussion of Biowm, swJanice L. Kopec, Case Note, 15
CAP. DEF.J. 451 (analyzing Brown v. Lee, 319 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2003)).
104.
Brmun, 319 F.3d at 174.
105. Id at 175.
106. Id at 169. Corrp N.C GEN. STAT. S 15A-1419 (2001) (specifying grounds for which
a motion for appropriate relief seeking redress from a North Carolina conviction must be denied),
uith N.C GEN. STAT. § 15A- 1419 (1978) (stating that "[although the court may deny the motion
under anyof the circumstances specified in this section, in the interest of justice and for good cause
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cases the petitioner relied on in that case were decided priorto the amendment.17
However, few cases will resemble Bnm because most state procedural default
rules do not have a built-in discretion clause. Taken together, Brom and Reid
indicate that a petitioner may successfully challenge the adequacy of a state
procedural default rule in the Fourth Circuit onlyin the rare circumstances when
the petitioner will be able to show several cases in which the rule was called to
the court's attention but not applied.
Maxwell C Smith

shown it may in its discretion grant the motion if it is otherwise meritorious").
107. BmrL, 319 F.3d at 171-72.

